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Whether developing a market access strategy or formulating a
negotiating plan for further global agricultural trade reform, US
agricultural trade policy needs a new paradigm.   The tenets of
the past served American agriculture well – opening of new markets
and leading multilateral negotiation that made significant strides
in global trade reform.
But the world today is a different place, the agricultural
trade landscape looks different then it did even as recently as
the launch of the Uruguay Round.  However, US policy has evolved
little.  Notwithstanding the strong points of US policy, that will
help lead to further those reforms, American agriculture needs
more than simply Uruguay Round II.
The new paradigm must be built on several of the 21st
Century’s new realities.  First, trade, including agricultural
trade, plays a central role in defining the post-Cold War era, in
particular in the way the US conducts its world affairs.  Second,
the world view that shaped US negotiations in the Uruguay Round
and since hardly accounts for the opportunities for American
agriculture in the future and, especially, the new dynamics of
whatever new round of multilateral trade negotiations lies ahead.  
Third, US agricultural trade policy has yet to account fully for
many of the emerging trends of the new century.
MARKET ACCESS OR TRADE REFORM?
Although market access and trade liberalization have been
the two pillars upon which US agricultural trade policy has been
built, they are not the same.  Their objectives may often
coincide, overlap, and complement one another but so too can they
conflict with one another, presenting the policy maker and the
negotiator tough choices.  So whether policy dictates a bilateral
,regional, or global approach to market access, it must first
reconcile that potential, and fundamental, conflict.
A trade negotiator must know many things, but all are
secondary to knowing one thing and consistently striving towards
it:  The negotiator, and by extension the policy, must know what
he or she wants.  It sounds simple, obvious; but unless the
negotiator, and by extension his or her government, firmly states
and adheres to a clear objective, the negotiator, and thus the
policy, is in peril.
For example, the US committed in the Uruguay Round to
negotiations at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to discipline the use of export credits.  Thosenegotiations continue.  There is little disagreement that the
Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) export credit programs are one
of the most significant, if not the single most instrumental, tool
the US is employing both to maintain market access in a number of
critical markets and to open new ones.  There is just as little
disagreement that additional disciplines on export credits, those
of the US as well as other countries, would contribute to greater
liberalization.
In this very important instance, there is a conflict between
the objective of promoting market access and trade reform.  This
conflict has been the paramount reason the OECD negotiations have
not yet concluded, and still present the parties some very
difficult decisions before an agreement can be concluded.
There are others, but this contemporary example strikingly
illustrates the need to reconcile the goals of market access and
trade reform.  Because if the policy does not set a primary goal –
be it market access or trade reform – it places the negotiator
attempting to execute policy in a negotiator’s most difficult
position – not knowing what he or she wants.
MARKET ACCESS:  WHAT WILL THE US BUY?
Market access, and by extension US agricultural trade
policy, is not and cannot be just about exports, what and how much
the US is selling, where, and on what terms, especially as trade
policy becomes more integral to the America’s overall relations
with other countries.  As the US seeks complimentary concessions
in new multilateral negotiations, import access – be it on a
bilateral, regional, or global basis – will grow in importance in
shaping the new paradigm for US agricultural trade policy.  Yet,
it largely is a poor stepchild to the drive for selling more.
If the US only grudgingly opens its markets, it cannot
reasonably expect complimentary concessions from others,
concessions that are the heart of the proposal the US laid out
before the World Trade Organization (WTO) last summer. 
Additionally, the extent exporters, particularly those in the
developing world, have access to the US market will determine
their ability to grow their own economies – growth that will
ultimately improving them as US customers and further
strengthening the ancillary, and crucial, relationships that
follow trade.
Indeed, many of the most difficult choices American
agriculture will likely face will be the terms of access the US is
prepared to permit to its market.  Yet, these will be decisions as
critical as any other because they will determine, in part, the
negotiator’s corollary guiding principle:   Know what you can pay,
and are willing to pay, to attain your objective.
CLINTON COMMERCIALISM
The first building block of the new agriculture trade
paradigm is recognizing the context in which agricultural trade
policy will be executed.  Many observers have, rightfully, pointedto the trade record of the Clinton Administration as among its
most important and enduring legacy in reshaping the US role in the
world in the post-Cold War.  However, it was not the Clinton
Administration that originated the policy
Dollars and diplomacy have gone hand in hand throughout US
history.  Even the former Administration’s crowning achievement in
this regard – the agreement to grant China permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR)– has it roots in the historic yearning of
American exporters to open the China market, a drive virtually as
old as the republic itself.
Nonetheless, with the end of the Cold War and the
dissolution of many of the political and diplomatic ties and
frictions that defined world affairs, and guided commercial
relations as well, for almost five decades, trade and commerce
have become the new language of world affairs.  The US will no
longer define its relations with other countries solely by
political alliances and allegiances, but also by commercial ties.
Likewise, commercial ties – objectives and concessions –
will increasingly be important in achieving and fleshing out
broader relationships and goals.  Again, the importance of China
PNTR cannot be understood fully as merely a commercial
relationship.  It is also as a turning point in the US goal of a
broader relationship with China and the aim of the US to bring
China more fully into the world community.
For agriculture trade policy, this evolution means a more
forthright view of the hand-in- glove relationship between farm
trade and foreign policy.  As much as some involved in US
agriculture cling to the notion that agriculture trade is and
should be a purely commercial matter, the truth is that the US has
often and frequently used farm trade for foreign policy
objectives, and that foreign policy has likewise served the
interests of farm exports.
This is certainly not a new trend.  One of most enduring
achievements of US diplomacy in recent years was the rebuilding of
Europe following the second World War, a job that would have been
infinitely more complex, perhaps unattainable, without the
contributions of American agriculture.  More recently, the
agricultural export assistance the US lent to Mexico and East Asia
were critical in stabilizing those economies during their
respective financial crises.  The aid that went from American
farms to Russian store shelves was likewise instrumental to US
efforts assisting Russia’s emergence from the former Soviet Union.
In sum, Clinton Commercialism is neither entirely new, but
it has defined more fully the role of trade in shaping the US
relationship with the world.  As one of the largest exporting
sectors of the economy, and most export sensitive, US agriculture
and food exports will, and should, find themselves more wholly
integrated into the US leadership role in the world.
BEYOND THE WASHINGTON-BRUSSELS AXISJust as the Cold War mentality no longer can dominate the
broader US role in the world, neither too can the Uruguay Round
mentality dominate US agricultural trade policy.  Yet, it does. 
US agriculture’s largest customers today are in Japan, Mexico,
Canada and many of American farmers’ most important customers in
the future will be in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  Yet, most
of US farm trade policy continues to be driven by the tensions and
negotiations that led up to, produced, and linger from the Uruguay
Round.
It is time to break out of the Eurocentric view that has so
dominated farm trade policy and, important, that has commanded so
many of US trade resources – from personnel to dollars to
political capital – for the last two decades.  The US farm trade
relationship with Europe will be important, but as the WTO
matures, proceeds with the Uruguay Round built-in agenda, and as
it attempts to produce another round of multilateral trade
negotiations, the US cannot afford to put all of its agricultural
trade eggs into the European basket.
But the US has, to a very, very large extent done just that. 
As important as the comprehensive proposal the US tabled at the
WTO is, it mostly continues the debate of the Uruguay Round,
taking direct aim at Europe without providing the same direct
response to the needs of the US customers of the future.
One of the first lessons of politics is learning to count,
and from that simple perspective alone, a flaw of current US
policy emerges.  In a body of over 140 members, the US and the EU
are but two.  An important lesson to learn from the negotiating
sessions the WTO conducted over the last year and as it prepares
for the March stock-taking session is the vigorous contribution
many of the other 140 plus members made, especially the developing
countries.
In short, the quad may have outlived its time.  While the
US, EU, Canada, and Japan must continue to play important
leadership roles in the WTO – singularly and collectively --
especially with respect to agriculture, done are the days when the
quad can, or should, preordain the outcome of future agricultural
trade negotiations.  Moreover, as the US looks to further its
objectives, many of the countries who have been on the outside
looking in those whose interests are similar to ours and, in terms
of market access, represent the future for American farmers and
food exporters.
THE US-EU FOOD FIGHT:  DOES ANYONE WIN?
While the lingering Uruguay Round differences between the US
and EU on farm and farm trade policy are striking, in many
respects, the similarities are equally compelling.  For example,
the EU’s insistence on adding multi-functionality to the core
negotiating principles at the WTO has been met with opposition,
hostility, and derision by many in the US agricultural community. 
Yet, US farm policy, in its broadest sense, is a model of multi-
functionality.  Few other farm policies in the world are designed
to achieve, and do in fact achieve, as broad, diverse, and multi-functional goals as does US policy.
Consequently, the US and EU have expended far too much time
and energy on a false argument, one largely over labels instead of
devoting that time and energy to providing leadership for a new
round of liberalization and cooperating to solve common problems.
For example, one of the most complex problems American
agriculture faces is the ensuring consumer confidence in the food
supply – be meat and poultry safety or acceptance of the products
of biotechnology.  Europe stands much to gain from learning the
lessons of how the US has structured its food confidence system,
which is indeed unmatched.  The US needs to understand the
European experience with problems such as the backlash against
biotechnology so US policies are not developed based only on the
sterility of the scientists’ laboratories but also account fully
for consumer and social worries.
The EU and US have an incredible stake in the growth of the
developing countries, and not simply a mercantile stake.  As their
agriculture and food systems mature, and their economies grow,
they will become better customers for the higher value products
that will become increasingly important to US agricultural
exports.  That process of growth – from farm to village to city –
will also be key to the maturation of their political stability
and integration into the world community.
WHAT LIES AHEAD?
Finally, a brief word about emerging trends that have
hitherto remained largely outside of the debate on agricultural
trade policy.  Although not central to questions about export
subsidies, domestic supports, or tariff levels, some of the
developments affecting world commerce will undoubtedly influence
both agricultural production and trade, and thus policy.
For example, the internet may well revolutionize the way
food trade is conducted just as it has changed the way many of us
buy books.  The rise of ever more multinational food companies who
straddle many, many political systems and the concentration of
this industry in the US as well as around the world, will
profoundly shape the way food is traded, and thus the need for
accompanying changes in food trade policy.  Finally, new
environmental trends – from global warming to protecting genetic
diversity to water scarcity – will affect world agricultural
production and thus needs to be accounted for in world, and US,
agricultural trade policy.
FARM TRADE’S TOP TO BOTTOM REVIEW
Now is an especially appropriate time to rethink US farm
trade policy.  The WTO is on the eve of its stock-taking session
to review the negotiating proposals put forward over the last year
and lay the foundation for further trade negotiations.  This comes
at the outset of new administration in the US, presumably sorting
through its policies and priorities, including taking a
comprehensive and fresh look at the future and US objectives.  Inso doing, it is appropriate that the new administration undertake
the agricultural trade policy equivalent of the top to bottom
review it has launched of defense policy.
That examination needs to account for the potential for
conflicts between policies of market access and trade
liberalization, the integration of agricultural trade policy into
all aspects of the US leadership role in world affairs, broadening
the focus of farm trade policy beyond the narrow confines of US-EU
disagreements, and explore new trends that may affect farming and
farm trade in the future.